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4 
Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security: 
. Exploring th_e Gray Area 
Glen Woodbury 
Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recov~r from attacks that do occur. 
-National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 20071 
Comprehensive emergency management can be defined as the preparation 
for and the carrying out of all emergency functions necessary to mitigate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters caused 
by all hazards, whether natural, technological, or human caused. 
-Principles of Emergency Management, September 200?2 
IT HAS BEEN SEVEN YEARS since a new profession and public safety discipline was created in the United States .. While the definition of homeland security, as stat-ed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, limits the focus of the discipline 
to addressing the threats of terrorism, the term has actually come to represent much 
more-an attempt to combine and collect the entire array of safety, security, and emer-
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What is the essence of the discord surrounding the term? Given that the discipline 
of emergency management also defines itself across all hazards, is homeland security 
then a new, singularly focused effort against terrorism, or is it the "catch-all" for every-
thing that preceded it in public safety and security? It is a question that has, to some 
extent, affected all levels of public safety disciplines and government agencies, but • 
none more so than the field of emergency management. An exploration of the appro-
priate role for emergency management within the context of homeland security yields 
a wide variety of intriguing conceptual, political, and operational issues that will ulti-
. mately affect the future of the discipline. 
ON INFLUENCE 
Homeland security is not yet a clearly defined discipline. While many practitio-
ners wear the patches of and claim employment by a homeland security agency, a 
homeland security professional identity is not yet widely claimed by individuals who 
serve in such an agency. "I work for homeland security" is probably the closest some 
might come to a claim of allegiance. This is not analogous to the claim of "I am a fire-. 
fighter," "I am a border security specialist," or "I arri. an emergency manager," as is 
found among people who more deeply personalize their professional endeavors. One 
reason for this is that the concept of homeland security encompasses more than one 
agency, career track, or discipline. It is also influenced by a greater body of efforts and 
Figure 4-1. Areas of homeland security influe~ce. 
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interests than most singular professions. Figure 4-1 tries to capture some, but by no 
means all, of these influencing factors. 
How do these spheres of influence affect one another? How do they affect the goal 
of achieving a secure homeland? Where do tensions exist, and where are there oppor-
tunities for collaboration? Depending on the issue or challenge, these spheres inter-
act dynamically and can shift, change, and overlap. How they interrelate in a policy 
development endeavor is different from how they interact in an operational response 
to an event. Discussions over funding present a different picture than a debate over 
civil liberty challenges. 
A pictorial depiction of homeland security is at times difficult for those who are 
inclined to operate in hierarchical worlds of "line and box" relationships. Homeland 
security is not chaotic, but it is complex.3 In other words, much of the context of 
homeland security has "flux and unpredictability," "no right answers," "unknown 
w-tknowns," "many competing ideas," and demands a "need for creative and innova-
tive approaches."4 Therefore, any discipline or profession, especially that of emergen-
cy management, that engages in the world of homeland security must recognize-and 
exist in the complexity of-competing and interacting influences that are dynamic and 
issue dependent. Engagement and leadership in homeland security require high levels 
of interaction, collaboration, and communication. 
ON FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS 
Perhaps the premise that homeland security is now, or was ever intended to be, 
a discipline or a profession is incorrect, in which case any attempt to compare home-
land security to emergency management in terms of their functional definitions may 
be flawed. Is homeland security more of an objective to be achieved while emergency 
management is something that is performed? If so, then the emergency management 
constituency might be more inclined to view its role as that of contributor to the objec-
tive of homeland security rather than as competitor with a new player on the pub-
lic safety playing field. Unfortunately, this is an oversimplification because there are 
individuals and organizations that have been appointed and established to perform 
what are considered to be homeland security activities. Therefore, unless those duties 
and tasks are clearly separate and distinct, conflict between emergency management 
and homeland security principals will occur. And since homeland security is still in 
its early, or pre-paradigm, phase,5 tasks and duties between and among public safety 
disciplines and homeland security activities are not clear, consistently distinct, or com-
monly agreed upon. 
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Equating all things that constitute homeland security with the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) also creates misperceptions and debate. As noted earlier, 
homeland security is about and entails much more than any single agency or area of 
influence. Certainly other agencies aside from the federal agency that bears the name 
have a key, if not lead, responsibility in achieving homeland security-for example, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Concurrently, DHS contributes activities that are 
well beyond the National Strategy's definition of homeland security. Was the response 
to Katrina or to the 2007 California wildfires an issue of homeland security or the 
province of just one agency within DHS? This question is not limited to the federal 
level as states and localities also have to struggle with policies and the placement of 
responsibilities, roles, and resources among existing and new organizational entities. 
For example, in one state, the mandated organizational design requires that a response 
to flooding fall within the purview of the homeland security agency, while in another 
state, the response clearly lies elsewhere. In between are all the "gray states" where 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities either have not been decided or are unclear. 
Another way to address this issue might be to decide that if an agency or discipline 
is focused on terrorism, it is doing homeland security, while if it is focused on disaster 
response and recovery, it is performing emergency management. But this assumes that 
the roles and activities of the entities responsible for homeland security on one hand 
Figura 4-2. Relationships between homeland security (HS) and emergency management 
(EM) entities: Organizational, policy, administrative, functional, management, and · 
accountability. 
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and for emergency management on the other are separate and distinct, which is not 
necessarily the case. 
As Figure 4-2 shows, the organizational relationships between homeland security 
and emergency management entities range from a complete separation of assigned 
roles to a unified or singular responsibility for all roles. Sometimes one entity is a sub-
set of the other; at other times, the entities share some specific tasks and objectives but 
each retains equal governmental stature. Nor are these conditions necessarily fixed in 
any one location for the range of functions that a government entity may be asked to 
perform. For example, two agencies may operate completely independently for policy 
and administrative tasks, yet come together and share responsibilities and authorities 
in the event of a crisis. 
Another issue in the definitional debate between homeland security and emergen-
cy management concerns the concepts of "ownership" and "primacy." These terms 
often mean" dominance." The activity or entity that dominates politically, fiscally, and 
operationally creates a tension with the other. This tension often manifests as an argu-
ment about the allocation of efforts toward all hazards versus the dedication of assets 
against those threats that may present a greater risk to homeland and national security. 
States and localities that have clearly and collaboratively determined the separation 
and intersection of roles and responsibilities between emergency management and 
homeland security have generally also marked the territories for money, influence, and 
command. Those states and localities that have not clarified responsibility and owner-
ship in the gray area may continue to debate where leadership should be assigned 
and, consequently, continue to argue about the allocation of money and resources. 
ON PREPAREDNESS AND THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH 
How the nation uses its resources to prepare for emergencies and disasters has 
added to the vigor of the debate over the spheres of emergency management and 
homeland security. The often-made claim that preparing for any type of disaster also 
prepares for terrorism has a converse body of advocates-those who argue that pre-
paring for terrorism also prepares for any type of disaster. How resources are allocated 
often depends on which theory of preparedness a decision maker espouses. The activ-
ity of "preparing" most generally means allocating resources for planning, training, 
exercising, and equipping. The all-hazards approach to preparedness activities is the 
predominant position of the emergency management community, while focusing pre-
paredness resources on the low-probability, but high-consequence nature of terrorist 
events is generally the position of homeland security agency leaders. Strong cases can 
be made for either position, which inevitably creates debate throughout the public 
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safety community and adds to resource allocation disagreements among other disci-
plines as well. While a fire agency might argue that the best allocation of resources is 
. . 
investing in more capability to respond to events of any type, a law enforcement entity 
might advocate that the wisest course of action is investing in prevention and protec-
tion. As the nation is discovering, both positions are valid. Figure 4-3 shows how the 
relationship between terrorism and the four phases of the emergency management 
cycle might be depicted. -
First, it is important to recognize that preparedness is not solely focused on 
response. Efforts and resources must also be directed toward preparing to prevent, 
Figure 4- 3. Relationships: Terrorism (left spheres) and all hazards (right spheres). · 
Preparedness 
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preparing to mitigate, and preparing to recover. While traditionally, and perhaps 
logically, most investment goes toward building and maintaining response capacity, 
the building of greater capability to prevent and mitigate crises, as well as to recover 
from them, also deserves some allocation of resources. No piece of the holistic process 
depicted in Figure 4-3 can be ignored. 
Second, strong arguments can be made that the response to those acts of terrorism 
that are most probable is not significantly different from the response to a natural or 
man-made hazard. However, this is only true as it is applied to the "lights and sirens" 
response generally confined to a specific geographical region. How society "responds" 
to a malevolent act by man compared with an act of nature or an accident is significantly 
different. One can imagine how the national response to 9 /11 would have differed had 
the cause been accidental, or how the response to the event that destroyed Greensburg, 
Kansas, on May 4, 2007, would have differed had the cause been a terrorist act instead 
of a tornado. The cause of the disaster or emergency is significant and therefore must be 
considered when determining how the nation is to prepare for a response. 
Third, preventing a criminal act is not analogous to mitigating a flood. Considering 
terrorism as "just another hazard" does not sufficiently acknowledge that resources, 
organizations, policies, influences, and investments are required that .are different 
from-and indeed are not part of-a traditional emergency management mitigation 
strategy. While the protection and resiliency of certain key resources and critical infra-
structure may be closely related within the emergency management and antiterrorism 
worlds, what is required to prevent a criminal act does not fall neatly within the habit-
ual all-hazards approaches used to prevent or lessen the consequences of a natural haz-
ard. Therefore, if the traditional emergency management community desires to assume 
the terrorism prevention aspects of homeland security, it must build and embrace new 
relationships, develop new models and processes, and advocate for resources to pre-
vent and mitigate this threat as well as it does all natural and technological hazards. 
Finally, the comprehensive long-term national recovery to a crisis also differs 
depending on the cause of the crisis. While basic infrastructure and emergency human 
needs under current disaster authorities may be addressed the same way regardless 
of cause, other factors will significantly challenge traditional approaches to recovery. 
Psychological and social recovery, contamination remediation and economic recov-
ery, and the magnitude .of civil population demands, legislative input, and executive 
branch attention will all differ depending on whether the cause was a deliberate act 
of man, an accident, or an act of nature-even if the actual physical consequences are 
nearly identical. 
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This "rethinking" of the traditional four phases of emergency management and 
the all-hazards approach raises a few additional considerations. Given what has been 
determined thus far, should the nation, or any locality, prepare differently than it has 
in the past? Who now "owns" the entire process for public safety and security, or 
are the individual elements under separate leadership? Looking at the life cycle of a 
hazard from prevention to recovery, have decisions been made regarding who is in 
charge and at what point in the process? Should leadership be dependent on whether 
the threat is natural or man-made? In functional terms, where should investments for 
overall public safety and security be placed and in what balance? 
These are important considerations. If the approach depicted in Figure 4-3 is com-
prehensive enough to capture all the functional areas required to address any threat, 
it also presents a starting point for discussions about implementation. The policies, 
strategies, and operational concepts required to realize this approach should be collab-
oratively developed among all stakeholders dedicated to national safety and security. 
If they are not, individual spheres of influence in the homeland security community 
will independently decide priorities, levels of effort, and resource allocations that will 
conflict with or overlap those of the emergency management community while other 
concerns go unaddressed. 
Figure 4- 4. Addressing the threat depiction. 
• 
Prevention ~ ~i~ga;i:of, 
. . - .. · 
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ON ADDRESSING THREATS 
Most threats and hazards to public health and safety come from the natural envi-
ronment. One could argue that the frequency and severity of natural hazards increase 
as populations grow in vulnerable areas, the global environment changes, and locali-
ties balance economic policies against risk reduction through disaster mitigation strate-
gies. One could also argue that there is no increase or decrease in frequency or severity; 
instead, the nation has just become more sensitive to disastrous events. Regardless, 
in the natural environment, and even in most of the technological arenas of threat, 
the ways in which threats are identified, forecasted, communicated, and prevented or 
mitigated (when feasible) have evolved through history and experience. As depicted 
in Figure 4-4, the different types of hazards and threats-man-made-intentional, man-
made unintentional, and naturally occurring-must all be addressed through identi-
fication, analysis, etc. But the actual and tactical application of these activities often 
differs depending on the type of hazard or threat among the three categories . . 
For example, threats of weather events, both distant and imminent, are generally 
well identified in hazard assessment efforts, disaster strategies, and operational plan-
ning. Agencies at all levels of government contribute to and collaborate on the analyses 
of these threats, short-and long-term forecasting, broad public and agency communica-
tions about the hazards, ways to prepare for them, and, when possible, actions and pol-
icies to reduce or prevent their impacts. One can look at any naturally occurring hazard 
and identify an exhaustive list of coordination and collaboration efforts to address this 
category of threat. Similarly, most known technological (or man-made unintentional) 
hazards, such as nuclear power plants, chemical facilities, and large dams, have under-
gone a long-term examination to address the potential threats they pose. 
The question arises, is there an analog to these methodologies for man-made 
intentional threats? At the most general level, the functional objectives for approach-
ing natural and technological accidents would be the same for the threat of terrorism. 
Terrorist threats need to be identified, analyzed, forecasted, etc., just as other threats 
and hazards are. However, nearly every activity, issue, challenge, and investment 
below the highest objective levels (from identification through prevention and miti-
gation) is different for addressing the threat of terrorism than for dealing with other 
hazards. There is also a different body of knowledge, different constituent groups, and 
different stakeholder communities. 
Processes, policies, and infrastructure to deal with domestic terrorism have not 
had the wealth of historical experiences to guide their development that natural haz-
ards have provided. Until recently, most state, local, and private entities have not had 
antiterrorism responsibilities in their professional and organizational portfolios. The 
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public policy implications of how the country addresses a hazard caused by malevo-
lent human beings are vastly more complex than the implications of how a hazard 
caused by Mother Nature is handled. As a result, both the roles and responsibilities for 
addressing the threat of terrorism either have fallen to a new group of individuals-
homeland security practitioners-or have been assumed as an additional responsibil-
ity by the more traditional public safety disciplines. Both results present challenges. 
The homeland security professionals are operating in a new world and have a new 
endeavor without historical · reference, whereas the traditional disciplines have to 
incorporate and accommodate the new tasks. 
Should addressing the threats of terrorism be led by the emerging homeland secu-
rity professionals, or should it be added to the roles and responsibilities of the tra-
ditional emergency management community? The answer to this question depends 
largely on determinations of how all risks will be managed, and on how both of these 
communities will apply leadership concepts and dynamics in the future. 
ON MANAGING RISK 
Perhaps at its most basic level, the relationship between emergency management 
and homeland security is best addressed in terms of their approaches · to managing 
risk. Both communities either explicitly or implicitly are performing activities, pro-
mulgating policies, and investing resources in accordance with the premise that risks 
to public health, safety, and security can be managed. "Managed" does not necessarily 
Figure 4-5. Managing risk Venn diagram. 
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mean eradicated; risks might be eliminated, reduced, deferred, transferred, or in some 
cases even embraced. While risk is defined and managed in a variety of ways, Figure 
4-5 illustrates one method for purposes of discussion. 
The diagram proposes that risk is a function of three interrelated components: 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. It also proposes that external influences, such 
as politics, public opinion, and the media, may affect how the three elements of risk-
as well as their interactions-are managed. In straightforward terms, one manages 
risk by attempting to manage the three components either individually or in com-
bination. For example, to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack, one might attempt to 
eradicate the threat, reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities,and/or invest in preparing 
for the consequences should the threat manifest itself against the vulnerabilities. It is 
also important to note that each of these three areas has depth and complexity that 
are not traditionally considered. For example, "vulnerabilities" are not just facilities 
or geographically confined locations; they include the nation's infrastructures, which 
are webs of interconnected networks and dependencies, as well as the psychological, 
cultural, and societal well-being of the general population. 
In a perfectly collaborative and coordinated world of multidisciplinary, multijuris-
dictional, and all-threats-and-hazards considerations, managing risk in line with this 
model would still be complicated, although not necessarily impossible. But as dis-
cussed earlier, this is not the environment in which the homeland security profession-
als, emergency management professionals, and a host of influential stakeholders find 
themselves. Which threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are more important than 
others is not commonly agreed upon. Therefore, risk management-based policies and 
investment justifications often come from the advocates with the most influence at 
the moment, not necessarily the most accurate arguments. The gray area between the 
roles of homeland security professionals and those of traditional emergency managers 
is most apparent in choices about which threats are more important as well as about 
which component of risk management to invest in. For example, one side of the debate 
might advocate that natural hazard threats are more important to mitigate against than 
less frequent terrorist acts, while the other side might argue that investments in terror-
ism prevention pay much larger dividends than trying to reduce the consequences of 
a hurricane. Still others argue that since terrorism and hurricanes cannot be prevented 
completely, the bulk of investment should go into response to the inevitable. This is 
not to imply that the emergency management community and the emerging home-
land security profession are on two distinct sides of these debates. Arguments in this 
area are as much intradisciplinary as they are interdisciplinary. One homeland security 
and emergency management professional describes the challenge this way: 
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Emergency management versus homeland security? The difference lies in 
the root cause: Act of God vs. Act of Man. And it builds out accordingly. We 
can't prevent (at least not in the same way as we talk about terrorism) a flood 
or an earthquake, or even a chemical plant accident. Emergency manage-
ment always assumes something has happened; it is a fait accompli. HL5 
[homeland security] presumes it is not only possible to prevent it in the first 
place, it's the central core mission, its raison d'etre. 
When focused on the consequences of an event, across all of what are referred 
to as the four phases, homeland security and emergency management do 
not differ. Preparedness efforts are based around potential post-event activi-
. ties; response and recovery are self-evident; and mitigation assumes that an 
event will occur and calls for actions to reduce potential damage from it. We 
try to jam prevention into mitigation and that's where we're getting stuck. 
It's not the same. Mitigation (as used by the EM community; unfortunately, 
no one else seems to get the term-of-art use) is useful and important in HL.5/ 
counterterrorism (e.g., target hardening) as a separate activity, but preven-
tion should be limited to those thing we're doing to "stop people from doing · 
bad things." . 
Other than that, it's the same.6 
So another way to look at the divide between the two communities is that emer-
gency management focuses almost exclusively on aftermath issues-even mitigation is 
about lessening impacts after something occurs-whereas homeland security is pri-
marily about stopping something before it happens. If this is truly the case, then obvi-
ously there will be disagreements over priorities and investments in managing risk. 
The national challenge that has been examined here is significant. Lack of com-
monly agreed-to principles concerning the nature of risk and its components means 
that policy and resource decisions must be resolved through other means. In other 
words, if risk management decisions are not being decided through objective, analyti-
cal, rational, and "best available science" processes, then they are most likely being 
determined through political influence and social persuasion. To expect the former 
approach to be the only one operative is naive, but to settle for the latter alone is 
perilous. To the extent that the latter holds sway, the communities and stakeholders 
who engage in the management of risk should agree to work toward arriving at more 
objectively derived decisions. 
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ON LEADERSHIP 
Perhaps the challenges found within the gray areas are best addressed through 
changes in leadership capabilities. In many organizations, disciplines, and profes-
sions, interaction with others is minimal. The leaders of these groups are not required 
to go outside their communities in order to advance and protect their own group's 
interests and missions. While there will always be some need to engage others and dis-
cuss issues, challenges, and opportunities, such interactions are not essential or critical 
to success. This is not the case, however, for either the traditional emergency man-
agement community or the emerging homeland security profession, both of which 
must work outside their professional, social, political, and cultural boxes to be suc-
cessful. Emergency management leaders must engage other agencies, organizations, 
persons, and resource owners to perform their missions. Homeland security leaders 
must use advanced skills of negotiation, relationship building, public communication, 
and political savvy to thrive among the spheres of influence that define the broader 
homeland security discipline (see Figure 4-1). What may be necessary for the future of 
both of these communities is the creation or discovery of "meta-leaders."7 
The art of meta-leadership derives from the capacity to envision a new 
connectivity of strategy and effort and then to find a way to communicate, 
inspire, and persuade broader participation. It is a creative and, most impor-
tant, a transformational endeavor. The meta-leader must often impart signifi-
cance to a vision or objective that does not already exist. Exceptional talent is 
required to describe that bigger picture and then imbue it with meaning that 
alters what others think and do. It is a difficult task. Through their behavior 
and actions, meta-leaders are able to motivate people to follow along, a par-
ticularly impressive feat given the fact that they operate without the direct 
power or authority to "order" others to follow .... 
To accomplish this feat, the meta-leader appreciates the distinct values, goals, 
motives, and missions of the different organizational silos that are recruited 
to coordinated action. He or she grasps how those differences could actually 
complement one another, even as they are generally seen as the rationale for 
waging battles for control. How is this accomplished? 
The meta-leader connects disparate groups by aligning core interests and 
motivations, redefining success not as a silo-driven objective but rather as a 
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product of the combined action and interaction of the multiple silos working 
in a coordinated synchronization.8 
Future success in both homeland security and emergency management, therefore, 
primarily requires change and growth in individual attributes, not necessarily orga-
nizational or policy adjustments. Dynamics of the relationship between the two fields 
will change and evolve, but they will be based on the directions, coordination, and col-
laborations of meta-leaders, and not on the pronouncements of individuals or entities. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
The elders of emergency management remember the transitional period of the 
1970s and 1980s, when their discipline and culture shifted from civil defense priori-
ties to the all-hazards and comprehensive emergency management approaches often 
advocated today. They also remind today's leaders that the conversion was not simple, 
without controversy, or ever clearly resolved. One can find professionals today who 
claim that the advent of homeland security proves the viability of the civil and nation-
al defense posture for emergency management (the "back to the future" position)_ 
Others argue that the birth of homeland security signals the end of the civil defense 
era-that the country's efforts against terrorism in no form or fashion resemble the 
domestic defense measures taken against the Soviet Union. The past is important to 
learn from, but as any stock market disclaimer will say, it is not a predictor of future 
performance. More accurately, the changes in policy, priorities, and investments in 
disaster preparedness from civil defense to the post-9 /11 environment reflect an evo-
lution, one that has sometimes been guided, sometimes unguided, but always sub-
jected to external, uncontrollable influences. 
Today, the gray areas of the homeland security and emergency management rela-
tionships can be observed as gaps, overlaps, and synchronicity. There are challenges 
and opportunities that both communities are aware of but that neither addresses fully_ 
There are circumstances and situations in which both communities engage, and there 
are examples of close communication, coordination, and collaboration in order to tack-
le problems that benefit all. As discussed in this chapter, the gray areas may be a result 
of the nature of the "megacommunity'19 that is homeland security. They may be caused 
or exacerbated by the fact that the two communities' purposes, functions, and ultimate 
objectives are not doctrinally well defined, or at least are not unanimously accepted. 
The gray areas may also be a signal that traditional approaches to public safety, health, 
and security need to be modified or rewritten. How threats and hazards are addressed 
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and how risk is managed need to be discussed and debated further-for terrorism in 
particular, but for all other hazards as well. 
The future presents opportunities as well as conflicts. One option is to let the dis-
cussions and debates over the gray areas naturally evolve over time, allowing external 
influences and events to take their resolutions in one direction or another. This may 
be a tenable course of action provided that the gaps, overlaps, and conflicts between 
emergency management and homeland security are not substantial impediments to 
the protection of the public and the nation at large. Another path to pursue would be 
to dictate the relationships in policy, strategy, and doctrine, making one community of 
interest supreme over the other. This could be accomplished through executive dictate, 
organizational design structuring, fiscal policy implementation, or law or ordinance--
as has already been done at various levels of government to meet the requirement for 
some kind of homeland security activity. The challenge in this case is that no clear 
demonstration of which relationship works best in all cases has emerged. Additionally, 
the jurisdictionally unique environments in which homeland security and emergency 
management operate require tailored and independent designs based on individual 
situations. Form often follows function. The required functions of individual agen-
cies, jurisdictions, and communities to protect their populations from harm are not the 
same from one to another. Therefore, their organizational designs will differ. 
While the conflicts that exist in the relationship between emergency management 
and homeland security appear to be organizational in nature, the solutions to them 
rest upon the shoulders of those individuals who can be described as meta-leaders. 
Many meta-leaders already exist and are effectively operating in the megacommunity, 
but more are needed. Identifying and creating additional leaders who possess a sense 
of the complexity of the environment, as well as the courage and skills to initiate prog-
ress, may be the most effective path to collaborative success and, therefore, the greater 
safety and security of the nation. 
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